Eliezer claims that dath ilani never give in to threats.

The only reason people will make threats against you, the argument goes, is if those people expect that you might give in. If you have an iron-clad policy against acting in response to threats made against you, then there’s no point in making or enforcing the threats in the first place. There’s no reason for the threatener to bother, so they don’t. Which means in some sufficiently long run, refusing to submit to threats means you’re not subject to threats.

This seems a bit fishy to me. I have a lingering suspicion that this argument doesn’t apply, or at least doesn’t apply universally, in the real world.

I’m thinking here mainly of a prototypical case of an isolated farmer family (like the early farming families of the greek peninsula, not absorbed into a polis), being accosted by some roving bandits, such as the soldiers of the local government. The bandits say “give us half your harvest, or we’ll just kill you.”

The argument above depends on a claim about the cost of executing on a threat. “There’s no reason to bother” implies that the threatener has a preference not to bother, if they know that the threat won’t work.

I don’t think that assumption particularly applies. For many cases, like the case above, the cost to the threatener of executing on the threat is negligible, or at least small relative to the available rewards. The bandits don’t particularly mind killing the farmers and taking their stuff, if the farmers don’t want to give it up. There isn’t a realistic chance that the bandits, warriors specializing in violence and outnumbering the farmers, will lose a physical altercation.

From the badnits’ perspective their are two options:

1. Showing up, threatening to kill the farmers, taking away ask much food as they can carry (and then maybe coming back to accost them again next year).
2. Showing up, threatening to kill the farmers, actually killing the farmers, and then taking away as much food as they can carry.

It might be easier and less costly for the bandits to get what they want by being scary rather than by being violent. But the plunder is definitely enough to make violence worth it if it comes to that. They prefer option 1, but they’re totally willing to fall back on option 2.

It seems like, in this situation, the farmers are probably better off cooperating with the bandits and giving them some food, even knowing that that means that the bandits will come back and demand “taxes” from them every harvest. They’re just better off submitting.

Maybe, decision theoretically, this situation doesn’t count as a threat. The bandits are taking food from the the farmers, one way or the other, and they’re killing the farmers if they try to stop that. They’re not killing the farmers so that they’ll give up their food.

But that seems fishy. Most of the time, the bandits don’t, in fact have to resort to violence. Just showing up and threatening violence is enough to get what they want. The farmers do make the lives of the bandits easier by submitting and giving them much of the harvest without resistance. Doing otherwise would be straightforwardly worse for them.

Resisting the bandits out of a commitment to some notion of decision-theoretic rationality seems exactly analogous to two-boxing in Newcom’s problem, because of a commitment to (causal) decision-theoretic rationality.

You might not want to give in out of spite. “Fuck you. I’d rather die than help you steal from me.” But a dath ilani would say that that’s a matter of the utility function, not of decision theory. You just don’t like submitting to threats, and so will pay big costs to avoid it, not that you’re following a policy that maximizes your payoffs.

So, it seems like the policy has to be “don’t give into threats that are sufficiently costly to execute that the threatener would prefer not to bother, if they knew in advance that you wouldn’t give in”. (And possibly with the additional caveat “if the subjunctive dependence between you and the threatener is sufficiently high.”)

But that’s a much more complicated policy. For one thing, it requires a person-being-threatened to accurately estimate how costly it would be for the threatener to execute their threat (and the threatener is thereby incentivized to deceive them about that).

Hm. But maybe that’s easy to estimate actually, in the cases where the threatener gets a payout of 0, if the person-being-threatened doesn’t cooperate with the threat? Which is the case for most blackmail attempts, for instances, but not necessarily “if you don’t give me some of your harvest, I’ll kill you.”

In lots of case, it seems like it would be ambiguous. Especially when there are large power disparities in favor of the threatener. When someone powerful threatens you the cost of executing the the threat is likely to be small for them, possibly small enough to be negligible. And in those cases, their own spite at you for resisting them might be more than enough reason to act on it.

[Ok. that’s enough for now.]